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altered if the jury is in reality a sub rosa dispenser of justice, erring if at all in
favor of the accused, for under this assumption the only difference would be
defendant-prone verdicts, something beyond the reach of an acquittal procedure. But if the jury be assumed to be prosecution-prone, a group which is
all too easily influenced to convict, then the strict test would appear more
desirable than the majority rule if only for the reason that it will more
significantly diminish the possibility of such jury behavior by removing the
opportunity therefor in a greater number of cases. This assumption, furthermore, is one of the historical bases of the acquittal practice and runs throughout criminal practice, as, for example, many exclusionary rules of evidence.
Which of the foregoing assumptions is empirically correct is not, however,
verifiable at this time. It would thus seem wise to err on the side of mercy
and follow the strict test.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the differences between the civil,
majority and strict tests for weighing the evidence on a motion for judgment
of acquittal are to some extent merely a matter of phraseology and of no
practical import. Yet the standard chosen will at least indicate a mode of
approach and as such will be crucial in many cases. Thus, the existence of
three different standards would seem prima facie undesirable, for not all can
be equally correct. Within the federal system, where each of these three tests
is advocated by at least one circuit, it may be anticipated that the matter will
soon be put to rest by the Supreme Court.35 At such time, it is to be hoped
that the solution is fully in accord with enlightened criminal procedurewhich is herein submitted to require adoption of the strict test.
reasonable conclusion is possible, both tests will reach the same result. In the former situation, since the jury is in effect instructed under the strict test they will find innocence on a
case sent to them under the majority rule, in which event there can be no difference. In the
latter situation, the jury is presumably not instructed under the strict test, but if the one
possible reasonable conclusion is only guilt (or only innocence), it is obvious that both tests
will come out the same.
Although no case is now pending, it may be inferred from a recent statement by Mr.
Justice Harlan in Stickel v. United States, 76 S.Ct. 1067 (1956), that the Court will probably review federal acquittal procedure when the issue is presented in a proper case.

LANDLORD'S DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES
UPON TENANT'S DEFAULT
In Gruman v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc.,' the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that a landlord could arbitrarily refuse to consent to a sublease to a suitable subtenant secured by the tenant in an attempt to mitigate
damages on a defaulted lease. The tenant had agreed not to "assign this lease
nor underlet said premises, or any part thereof, without the consent of the
1247 Minn. 502,78 N.W.2d 377 (1956).
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Lessor in writing."'2 The parties of the action stipulated that the proposed
subtenant, the Postmaster General of the United States, was "in all respects
a highly satisfactory, desirable, and suitable subtenant. . .. ,"3Although no
case involving a similar fact situation had previously been decided in Minnesota, the court thought its decision dictated by a "majority rule" that:
[I]n a lease such as this the lessor does not have the duty of mitigating damages;
[and] may arbitrarily refuse to accept a subtenant suitable and otherwise responsible....
4
However, only one of the twenty-five cases cited is authoritative for the
proposition that if the tenant has agreed not to sublet without the landlord's
consent, a landlord may arbitrarily refuse to consent to a sublease to a suitable subtenant secured by the defaulting tenant.6 The remaining cases hold
only that a landlord need not seek out or let to a new tenant if the defaulting
tenant vacates or abandons the premises.6
The Gruman opinion confuses two situations. In the first, that represented
by the Gruman facts, the tenant locates a suitable subtenant and requests the
landlord's consent to a sublease. The issue here is whether or not the landlord
has the duty to mitigate damages by consenting to the sublease, even though
the tenant has contracted, by a no-sublease clause, to give the landlord complete discretion to reject any individual subtenant. In considering this issue
in the Gruman case the court failed to distinguish a second situation where
the tenant abandons before the end of the term without locating a subtenant.
Here the issue is whether or not the landlord has the duty to mitigate damages by seeking out and letting to a new tenant. 7 The issue is not significantly
altered if the new tenant is procured by the original tenant and a second lease,
rather than a sublease, is proposed. In either variation of this second situation
it may be conceded that the landlord is not required to mitigate damages by
letting directly to the new tenant because he may thereby waive his right to
any damages.8
2
Ibid., at 504 and 378.
'Ibid., at 505 and 379.
'Ibid., at 505-6 and 379.
'Friedman v. Thomas 3. Fisher & Co., 88 A.2d 321 (Mun.App.D.C., 1952), holds that
a landlord may arbitrarily refuse his consent for subletting to a party proffered by the
tenant without reducing the tenant's liability in an action for rentals. See Manley v. Kellar,
47 Del. 511, 94 A.2d 219 (Super.Ct., 1952); Zucker v. Dehn, 128 N.J.L. 435, 26 A.2d 564

(1942).

'Cases cited in Gruman v. Diversified Services, Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 506, 78 N.W.2d 377,
379-80 (1956). One of these cases, Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114, 20 So.2d 346
(1944), holds only that the landlord cannot recover rentals not yet due.
' The presence or absence of a no-sublease clause is immaterial in this situation for, absent
the original tenant's acquiescence, any new tenant would hold directly under the landlord
and would not be a subtenant.
8 Consult discussion at 569 infra. Compare the rule in a small minority of jurisdictions
which apply the contract rule and require the landlord to seek a new tenant. Friedman v.
Colonial Oil Co., 236 Iowa 140, 18 N.W.2d 196 (1945); Maremont v. Axe, 135 Kan. 368,
10 P.2d 836 (1932) ; see Galvin v. Lovell, 257 Wis. 82,42 N.W.2d 456 (1950).
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The question presented by the Gruman facts, where the original tenant
requests the landlord's consent to a sublease, is less obvious. The Gruman
case presents squarely a conflict between a policy favoring the sanctity of the
contractual no-sublease clause and policies favoring mitigation of damages
and the free alienability of property interests. The general function of expectation damages in contract law is to place the injured party in as good a
position as he would have been had the contract been fully performed; 9 the
purpose of the rule requiring mitigation of damages is to obviate compensation by the defendant for losses which the plaintiff might reasonably have
avoided. 10 As a lease is at least partially a contractual relationship, it would
seem that the mitigation rule should apply to the defaulting tenant's liability
for unpaid rent unless there are factors peculiar to the lease-contract compelling a contrary result. The Gruman court pointed to three factors supposedly
rendering the mitigation of damages rule inapplicable where the defaulting
tenant requests the landlord's consent to a sublease; each factor will be seen
to be inapplicable if the basic distinction, outlined above, between a consent
to sublease and an original lease to a new tenant is borne in mind.
First, the Gruman court argued that one of a landlord's reasons for entering into non-cancellable leases is to eliminate the burden of continually seeking out new tenants. This argument is irrelevant, however, for in the Gruman
situation the defaulting tenant has procured the putative subtenant, and to
require the landlord to mitigate damages by consenting to the sublease would
impose no such burden.
Second, the Gruman court feared that the property relationship between
the landlord and the defaulting tenant might be jeopardized if the landlord
were forced to seek out and let to a new tenant. This could result because the
landlord's actions-inconsistent with the continued existence of the tenant's
estate"-might be taken as an acceptance of the tenant's abandonment,
thereby terminating the landlord-tenant relationship and releasing the defaulting tenant from further liability for rentals.' 2 This would not be the case
9Sharp, Promissory Liability, 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1939) ; Fuller and Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L. J. 52, 54 (1936).
O 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1039 (1951).
"[A surrender by operation of law], as said by Parke, B., in Lyon v. Reed, 13 M. & W.
285, 306, can only take place 'where the owner of a particular estate has been a party to
some act, the validity of which he is by law afterwards estopped from disputing, and which
would not be valid if his particular estate had continued to exist.' Such would be the case

of a lessor taking unqualified possession of demised premises, and dealing with them in a
way wholly inconsistent with the continuance of an already existing and unexpired term.
In such a case, as against the lessor, the law, upon the principle of estoppel, implies a mutual
agreement between him and his lessee, whereby the possession of the premises has been

abandoned by the latter, and resumed by the former, in pursuance of such agreement."
Gruman v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 508, 78 N.W.2d 377, 381
(1956) (brackets supplied by the court), quoting Nelson v. Thompson, 23 Minn. 508, 512

(1877).
" Consult Tiffany, Real Property

§§902, 962 (3d ed., 1939).
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if the landlord acts as the defaulting tenant's agent in securing a subtenant;' 3
but, since the courts do not agree upon the time when the agency relationship
is established, if a landlord re-rents he acts at the peril of releasing the defaulting tenant from further liability for rentals. 1 4 When, as in the Gruman
case, the defaulting tenant negotiates directly with the new tenant, however,
involving the landlord only to obtain his permission for the proposed sublease, there is no act which could conceivably be regarded as inconsistent
with the continued existence of the tenant's estate. In such a situation the
landlord not only may continue to look solely to the original tenant for his
rentals but also has the added security of the subtenant's liability to the
tenant.
Equally unpersuasive is the court's final argument that the lease clause
requiring the landlord's permission to sublet or assign entitled the landlord to
an unrestricted personal choice of tenants. It is true that the landlord, because
of his legal responsibility for the condition of the premises, 15 should not be
denied the protection in choice of occupants he has sought by requiring
permission to sublet.' 6 But this is not to say that he should be given the same
right of tenant selection as if he were acting for himself. Even in employment
contracts, where the personal relationship plays a much greater role, courts
have imposed a duty on wrongfully discharged employees to accept similar
employment if available, or forfeit the right to damages for the amount which
could have been earned." 7 Similarly, the landlord should be held at least to a
reasonable commercial standard in exercising his discretionary power to reject
a proposed subtenant. Application of this standard is not unprecedented in
the law of landlord and tenant. The standard has been accepted and defined
in cases in which the landlord re-entered under a provision of the lease per"Ogden v. Rowe, 3 E. D. Smith 312 (N.Y.C.P., 1854); Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant
§§1340, 1341 (1920).

'In McGrath v. Shalett, 114 Conn. 622, 159 Atl. 633 (1932), after the tenant had vacated, the landlord entered, materially altered the premises, and relet to a third party without notifying the original tenant. The court, allowing the landlord to recover the difference
in rentals from the original tenant, said that the landlord should not be penalized for attempting to minimize damages or for attempting to keep his property from deteriorating.
But in Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 388, 56 N.E. 903 (1900), although the landlord refused to accept the keys and notified the vacated tenant that he was
reletting the premises on the tenant's account, the court held that the act of the landlord in
reletting under such circumstances operated as acceptance of the tenant's offer to surrender.
'Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922) ; Rest., Torts §§360, 361 (1934).
As a general rule, absent a clause in the lease requiring the landlord's permission to sublet, a tenant may rent to whomever he chooses. Syracuse Savings Bank v. D'Elia, 56
N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. Mun. Ct., 1945); Leslie v. Sherman, 157 Kan. 157, 139 P.2d 133
(1943) ; Granite Trust Bldg. Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 36 F.Supp. 77 (D.
Mass., 1940).
17Schisler v. Perfection Milker Co., 193 Minn. 160, 258 N.W. 17 (1934) ; Flickema v.
Henry Kraker Co., 252 Mich. 406, 233 N.W. 362 (1930); McClelland v. Climax Hosiery
Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930).
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mitting him to do so after the tenant abandoned the premises.' s In such cases,
although the landlord is not required to relet the premises for a longer period
than the term of the original lease, 19 it may be his duty to let them for a
shorter period.20 The landlord is not required to relet them for a different
purpose if he reasonably believes that such use will damage the premises. 21
Although the landlord is not required to alter the premises to secure a new
tenant, he must put the premises in a condition to be occupied.2 2 Courts have
gone so far as to hold that the landlord is not acting for himself in the reletting, and mere opinion, unsupported by reason, would be insufficient ground
for rejecting a tenant.2 3 The standard has also been defined where the lease
forbids subletting without the landlord's consent but provides that such consent will not be unreasonably withheld. One such case held it unreasonable for
a landlord, whose place of business was within two blocks of the leased
premises, to refuse to accept a proposed subtenant engaged in the same type
of business.
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The factors to which the Gruman court pointed are, therefore, not controlling under the circumstances involved there, where the defaulting tenant
requests the landlord's consent to a sublease. The general contracts rule requiring mitigation of damages should, therefore, be applicable to the Gruman
situation even though, under present law, that rule clearly does not require
the landlord to seek out or let directly to a new tenant.
A proposed solution would be to give the landlord the option of consenting
to a suitable subtenant or of crediting the defaulting tenant, in any action
against him for rentals on the leasehold, with the amount which would have
been paid by the subtenant had he been accepted. 25 The tenant should be
"eMonger v. Luterbok, 195 N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 (1928) ; Greenstine v. Srere, 222 Mich.
25, 192 N.,. 676 (1923).

" Rohinson Seed &Plant Co. v. Hexter & Kramer, 167 S.W. 749 (Tex. Civ. App., 1914).
'Leo v. Pearce Stores Co., 57 F.2d 340 (E.D. Mich., 1932).
'Allen v. Saunders, 6 Neb. 436 (1877); Consumers Market House Co., v. Powers,
192 Ill.App. 89 (1915).

-2 Woodbury v. Sparrell Print, 198 Mass. 1, 84 N.E. 441 (1908).
'Fitch v. Armour, 14 N.Y.Supp. 319 (Super. Ct., 1891).
'The court pointed out that if the landlord had desired to prevent subletting of the
premises to a business competitor he should have so stated in the lease. Since he had not
done this his objection to the subtenant was both arbitrary and unwarranted. Edelman v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 252 Ill.App. 142 (1929).
- The same result should be reached even if the lease specifically states that the landlord
can reject a proffered tenant in his absolute discretion without crediting the lessee with the
rentals which would otherwise have been received. If such a clause were given effect it would
be tantamount to allowing a party to contract out of his duty to mitigate damages. The
reasons for making the landlord credit the rentals if he does not accept a suitable tenant
under the type of lease involved in the Gruman case apply with equal force to a lease which
purports to make this obligation subject to the landlord's absolute discretion.
The courts refuse to enforce penalty provisions because "justice requires nothing more
than compensation measured by the amount of the harm suffered." 5 Corbin, Contracts
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required not only to prove that the proposed subtenant meets reasonable
commercial standards of credit and reputation but also to disprove any
particular allegations that the landlord's interests would be damaged by the
proposed subtenancy. This solution allows the landlord to protect his legitimate business interests and to meet the legal requirements of care in tenant
selection, for he can still, in the exercise of reasonable discretion, reject a
truly undesirable subtenant. At the same time it relieves the tenant from
unnecessary hardship and permits more efficient utilization of the community's
economic resources.
§1057, at 280 (1951). Similarly, a clause which exempts a party from his obligation to avoid
damages should not be enforced since justice does not require compensation for harm
needlessly suffered.

COLLECTION CAPERS: LIABILITY FOR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
The legality of widespread debt collection practices has been a fertile and
ever-increasing source of controversy. The creditor, or more commonly a
collection agency, may continually hound the debtor with threats ranging
from the institution of legal proceedings to the economic and social pressure
afforded by exposure of the debtor's financial circumstances to others. Moreover, as illustrated by several recent cases, these threats are in many instances
carried out.' This comment will discuss the existing legal restrictions on such
collection activity with the aim of delineating the boundaries of permissible
conduct.
Unauthorized Practice of Law
The creditor seeking payment will often enlist the services of a commercial
collection agency. Conflict between certain practices followed by these agencies and the efforts of the bar to eliminate lay competition forms a focal point
for present legal dispute.2 When such conflict exists, the sanction may be
formidable. The layman who is held to be engaged in the unauthorized prac'For descriptions of collection activity consult, e.g., Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133
N.E.2d 340 (1956), noted in 7 West. Res. L. Rev. 461 (1956), and 2 Wayne L. Rev. 240
(1956); Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). Consult also
Butterfield, Collection Agencies and the Courts, 5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 47 (1938) ; Birkhead, Collection Tactics of Illegal Lenders, 8 Law & Contemp. Prob. 78 (1941) ; Otterbourg,
Collection Agency Activities: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Bar, 5 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 35 (1938) ; Nugent, Devices for Liquidating Small Claims in Detroit, 2 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 259 (1935); Harris, Improper Methods of Collecting Debts, 58 Corn.
L. J. 5 (1953).
2 Consult Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among Power
Groups, 4 Kan. L. Rev. 1 (1955), for an exhaustive treatment. Closely analogous to activities of the American Bar Association in this regard are the activities of the American Medical Association, discussed in The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and

Policies in Organized Medicine, 63 Yale L. 3. 938 (1954).

